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Abstract
Two natural and desirable properties for capital allocation rules are top-down consistency
and shrinking independence. Top-down consistency means that the total capital is determined
by the aggregate portfolio risk. Shrinking independence means that the risk capital allocated to
a given business line should not be affected by a proportional reduction of exposure in another
business line. These two properties are satisfied by, respectively, the Euler allocation rule and the
stress allocation rule. We prove an impossibility theorem which states that these two properties
jointly lead to the trivial capital allocation based on the mean. When a subadditive risk measure
is used, the same result holds for a weaker version of shrinking independence, which prevents
the increase in risk capital in one line, when exposure to another is reduced.
Keywords: Euler allocation, stress scenarios, top-down consistency, shrinking independence
1 Capital allocation rules
Capital allocation is an active topic for researchers in risk management and practitioners in
the financial industry. In a quantitative context, capital allocation problems were often studied
together with risk measures, as in the axiomatic settings of Denault (2001) and Kalkbrener (2005);
see Dhaene et al. (2012) for a list of capital allocation methods based on risk measures.
We first explain the mathematical setting for capital allocation. Fix a probability space
(Ω,F ,P) and some q ∈ [1,∞]. Let X be the set Lq of random variables X with finite q-th moment,
i.e., E[|X|q] <∞ if q ∈ [1,∞) and ess-sup(X) <∞ if q =∞.
Each random vector X = (X1, . . . , Xd) ∈ X d represents the vector of risks from multiple busi-
ness lines; positive outcomes of each Xi are understood as losses. An allocation rule Λ is a mapping
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from X d to Rd. For X ∈ X d and an allocation rule Λ, we denote by Λ(X) = (Λ1(X), . . . ,Λd(X))
where Λi(X) represents the amount of capital allocated to line i ∈ {1, . . . , d}, also called the risk
capital. Capital allocation is intimately linked to risk measures. A risk measure in this paper is a
continuous and law-invariant mapping ρ : X → R.1 We do not require anything beyond continuity
and law invariance, which is satisfied by all risk measures in the literature and risk management
practice. Even law invariance can be easily relaxed; see Section 4.2.
Examples of capital allocation rules include the proportional allocation, the Euler allocation,
the Aumann-Shapley capital allocation, and those based on stress scenarios. Formal definitions of
some capital allocation rules are put in Appendix A; below we give two specific examples which are
sufficient to illustrate our main message. These two examples share the general form
Λ(X) = EQX [X], i.e., Λi(X) = EQX [Xi] for i = 1, . . . , d, (1)
where QX is a probability measure determined by the risk vector X.
1. The Euler allocation based on the Expected Shortfall (ES)2 is one of the most popular rules
in capital allocation; see e.g., Kalkbrener (2005). It is defined as a special case of (1) by








i=1Xi>sp}, for some p ∈ (0, 1), (2)
where sp is the p-quantile of S :=
∑n
i=1Xi. Here we assume that S is continuously distrib-
uted.3 This leads to Λi(X) = E[Xi|S > sp], i = 1, . . . , d. The total capital is
∑d
i=1 Λi(X) =
E[S| > sp], which is the ES of the total risk S at level p.
2. The mixture-stress allocation proposed by Millossovich et al. (2021) is based on stress scenarios
generated directly by the risk vector X. It is defined as a special case of (1) by









θ, for some θ > 0, (3)
where each Xi is assumed to have a continuous distribution function Fi.
4 The total capital
for the stress allocation rule is given by
∑d
i=1 Λi(X) = EQX [S]. The mixture-stress allocation
1Continuity is with respect to the norm on X = Lq. A mapping ρ is law invariant if ρ(X) = ρ(Y ) for identically
distributed X,Y ∈ X .
2This allocation rule is also known as the CTE allocation; see Dhaene et al. (2012).
3More precisely, we require {S > sp} to have probability 1− p. If this does not hold, then we need to replace the
event {S > sp} with a p-tail event of S introduced by Wang and Zitikis (2021).
4The case of discontinuity can be defined similarly using a uniform transform; see Millossovich et al. (2021).
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rule belongs to the class of stress allocation rules of Millossovich et al. (2021) in Appendix A.
Our main result does not need to assume any specific form of allocation rules such as (1), (2) or
(3); the above examples are introduced only to motivate the two important properties in the next
section.
2 Desirable properties for an allocation rule
We introduce three desirable properties for an allocation rule Λ. All statements are meant to
hold for all X = (X1, . . . , Xd) ∈ X d.
(i) Vanishing continuity : Λi(εX)→ 0 as ε ↓ 0.
(ii) Top-down consistency :
∑n
i=1 Λi(X) = ρ(
∑n
i=1Xi) for some risk measure ρ with ρ(1) = 1.
(iii) Shrinking independence: Λi(X1, . . . , Xj−1, aXj , Xj+1, . . . , Xd) = Λi(X) for all j 6= i and a ∈
(0, 1).
Vanishing continuity (i), meaning that the allocated capital shrinks to 0 for a vanishing risk, is
satisfied by any sensible capital allocation rule. For instance, it is weaker than positive homogeneity:
Λ(εX) = εΛ(X) for ε > 0, and positive homogeneity is satisfied by almost all capital allocation
rules, including the ones mentioned in Section 1 and Appendix A.
Top-down consistency (ii)5 means that the total capital requirement can be calculated from
a risk measure that depends solely on the model of the aggregate position. All top-down methods
generated from a pre-specified risk measure satisfy this property. Indeed, it is the starting point
of many studies on capital allocation; see e.g., Denault (2001), Kalkbrener (2005), and Tsanakas
(2009) where this property is encoded in the definition of an allocation based on a risk measure.
In particular, it is satisfied by the Euler allocation rules, including the ES-based Euler allocation
in (2). Nevertheless, in risk management practice, the total capital requirement is not necessarily
calculatedby any specific risk measure on well-structured models, but could indeed be exogenous
to the allocation problem; see Remark 2.4 of Asimit et al. (2019).
Shrinking independence (iii) reflects the requirement that decreases in the exposure to one
line of business do not lead to changes in the capital allocated to another line. This property is
particularly relevant in an insurance context, since there are typically no or weak hedging effects
among different business lines. Shrinking independence has also a clear organizational benefit, as
5This property is also referred to as the full allocation requirement or, particularly in a game theoretic context,
as efficiency .
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a stability property of capital allocations. If shrinking independence does not hold, the manager
of a line of business may see their allocated capital change (even increase), in response to portfolio
changes outside their control. Indeed, this is a reason why insurance practitioners are often reluctant
to operationalize Euler allocations. A relaxation of shrinking independence, replacing the equality
by an inequality, is discussed in Section 4.1.
Shrinking independence is satisfied by any allocation rule induced by an invariant stressing
mechanism of the type introduced by Millossovich et al. (2021), including the mixture-stress alloc-
ation in (3). Indeed, the mixture-stress allocation rule satisfies the stronger property
(iv) Strong independence: for each i, Λi(X1, . . . , Xj−1, g(Xj), Xj+1, . . . , Xd) = Λi(X) for j 6= i and
a strictly increasing function g.
Strong independence thus ensures robustness of allocated risk capital not only to reductions in
exposure, but also to more general monotonic risk reductions, e.g., by the purchasing reinsurance.
Mathematically, this means that the allocated capital to business line i depends only on the distri-
bution of Xi and the dependence structure (copula) of X. See also the discussions and a real-data
example in Millossovich et al. (2021).
Properties (iii) and (iv) are also satisfied in the case that the risk capital of each business
line is individually computed by a risk measure; that is, each Λi(Xi) solely depends on Xi. Such
individual allocations are not of further interest to us, as they ignore aggregation or diversification
effects.
Remark 1. We do not impose continuity of Λ in X d because the capital allocation rules based on
invariant stressing mechanisms in Millossovich et al. (2021) are not necessarily continuous when
handling discrete risk factors; for instance, discontinuity may arise in (3) when a sequence of
continuous risk vectors (Xn)n∈N converges to a risk vector X with some discrete components.
Instead, we only require the vanishing continuity, a much weaker requirement.
3 An impossibility theorem
We establish an impossibility theorem to show that independence and top-down consistency
conflict in the sense that, together with vanishing continuity, they jointly force the allocation rule
to be the trivial one based on the mean under some pre-specified probability measure. This result
is an impossibility theorem because in practice, the total capital requirement cannot be computed
using the mean.
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Theorem 1. An allocation rule Λ satisfies properties (i)-(iii) if and only if Λ(X) = E[X] for all
X ∈ X d.
Proof. The “if” statement is straightforward, and we only show the “only if” statement. Take an
arbitrary X = (X1, . . . , Xd) ∈ X d. For ε ∈ (0, 1) and i = 1, . . . , d, let
Xε−i = (εX1, . . . , εXi−1, Xi, εXi+1, . . . , εXd),
that is, the risk vector X multiplied by ε except for the i-th component. Applying shrinking
invariance (iii) repeatedly leads to
Λi(X
ε
−i) = Λi(X) for each i. (4)
















 for each i. (5)









−i) for each i. (6)
Moreover, (iii) also implies that for j 6= i, we have Λj(Xε−i) = Λj(εX). By using vanishing continuity












→ ρ(Xi) as ε ↓ 0. (7)
Therefore, (6) and (7) lead to Λi(X) → ρ(Xi). Noting that Λi(X) does not depend on ε, we have














i.e., ρ is additive. Since ρ is continuous, additive and law invariant with ρ(1) = 1, we get from
Lemma 1 below that ρ(X) = E[X] for all X ∈ X . Hence, the allocation rule Λ has to be the
mean.
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The following lemma contains a known result used in the proof of Theorem 1, although we did
not find an explicit statement; such a result appeared in, for instance, the proof of Lemma A.1 of
Wang and Zitikis (2021). We provide a simple proof for the reader familiar with techniques in the
theory of risk measures. A similar result without law invariance is Lemma 2 in Section 4.2 which
is used to discuss the impossibility theorem by relaxing law invariance of the risk measure ρ.
Lemma 1. A mapping ρ : X → R is continuous, additive, and law invariant if and only if ρ(X) =
ρ(1)E[X] for all X ∈ X .
Proof. The proof is adapted from that of Lemma A.1 of Wang and Zitikis (2021). Part (⇐) is
trivial to check, and we thus only prove part (⇒). Let λ = ρ(1). Continuity and additivity gives
ρ(c) = λc for c ∈ R. Continuity and additivity also imply that ρ(aX) = aρ(X) for a > 0, which
further implies convexity of ρ. Hence, ρ is a finite coherent risk measure multiplied by λ on Lq; the
arguments below show that ρ is Fatou continuous (Definition 7.23 of Rüschendorf (2013)).
1. If q ∈ [1,∞), then, ρ is a finite convex risk measure (multiplied by λ), which is Fatou con-
tinuous by Rüschendorf (2013, Theorem 7.24).
2. If q =∞, then law invariance of ρ implies Fatou continuity by Theorem 30 of Delbaen (2012).




for a measure Q on (Ω,F); see e.g., Rüschendorf (2013, Theorem 7.20) and Föllmer and Schied
(2016, Exercise 4.2.1). Since ρ is law invariant, Q has to be equal to P multiplied by a constant.
4 Relaxations of the properties
In this section we discuss two possible relaxations of properties (ii) and (iii). The main message
is that with reasonable relaxations and some other additional assumptions, we arrive at the same
conclusion of the impossibility theorem.
4.1 Relaxing shrinking independence
Shrinking independence (iii) may be seen as quite strong, as it requires that the allocated
capital to line i with risk Xi remains unchanged, when reducing another line with risk Xj for j 6= i.
A natural relaxation of this property is
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(iii’) Weak shrinking independence: Λi(X1, . . . , Xj−1, aXj , Xj+1, . . . , Xd) 6 Λi(X) for all j 6= i and
a ∈ (0, 1).
Weak shrinking independence (iii’) means that if another line of business reduces their risk exposure,
then the allocated capital for an unchanged business line does not increase (but may decrease). This
property is much weaker than (iii), and it is arguably quite natural in an insurance context. As
reduction in exposure to Xj would be expected to reduce the risk of the portfolio, (iii’) only requires
that this change has no adverse impact on other lines of business i 6= j.
The property (iii’) in place of shrinking independence (iii) is too weak to establish the impossib-
ility theorem. In the literature of capital allocation, one often considers a coherent risk measure
which calculates the total capital; see e.g., Kalkbrener (2005).6 In such a setting, we can strengthen
(ii) to
(ii’) Top-down consistency with a subadditive risk measure:
∑n
i=1 Λi(X) = ρ(
∑n
i=1Xi) for some
subadditive risk measure ρ with ρ(1) = 1.
It turns out that the impossibility theorem holds for (ii’) and (iii’) in place of (ii) and (iii).
Theorem 2. An allocation rule Λ satisfies properties (i), (ii’) and (iii’) if and only if Λ(X) = E[X]
for all X ∈ X d.
Proof. We follow the same logic and the same notation as in the proof of Theorem 1. With weak






















→ ρ(Xi) as ε ↓ 0. (10)

















Thus, ρ is additive. Using Lemma 1 we know that ρ is the mean.
6A coherent risk measure of Artzner et al. (1999) is defined to satisfy four properties: monotonicity, translation
invariance, positive homogeneity, and subadditivity. The only property here we need is subadditivity: ρ(X + Y ) 6
ρ(X) + ρ(Y ) for X,Y ∈ X .
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Remark 2. Assume that top-down consistency (ii) holds. In this setting, Kalkbrener (2005) further
imposed a property called diversification: Λi(X) 6 ρ(Xi) for each i, meaning that the risk capital
for the sub-portfolio Xi of portfolio X does not exceed the risk capital if Xi is considered as a
stand-alone portfolio.7 It is clear that this property is stronger than requiring ρ to be subadditive.
Hence, such an enhancement of (ii) in place of (ii’) is also sufficient for Theorem 2.
4.2 Relaxing law invariance
We first relax law invariance in the assumption of the risk measure ρ appearing in top-down
consistency. Absence of law invariance means that the total capital can be assessed not only based
on the distribution of the total risk, but also on other characteristics, such as scenario-based analysis;
see Wang and Ziegel (2021) for a theory of non-law-invariant risk measures in risk management. In
the next result, we will see that allowing for this extra flexibility in the risk assessment does not
give rise to more choices of capital allocation rules; we return to the case of the mean, with respect
to a probability measure possibly different from P. Below, Q  P means that Q is absolutely
continuous with respect to P.
Theorem 3. Let X = Lq for some q ∈ [1,∞), and in this theorem the risk measure ρ is not
necessarily law invariant. An allocation rule Λ satisfies properties (i)-(iii) if and only if Λ(X) =
EQ[X] on X d for some probability measure Q P.
The proof of Theorem 3 follows from similar arguments as in that of Theorem 1, and we only
mention the differences. Law invariance appears in the proof of Theorem 1 through the application
of Lemma 1. Lemma 2 below is a variant of Lemma 1 which does not rely on law invariance. Having
Lemma 2 (a) in place of Lemma 1 leads to a proof of Theorem 3.
Lemma 2. (a) A mapping ρ : Lq → R where q ∈ [1,∞) is continuous and additive if and only if
ρ(X) = ρ(1)EQ[X] on Lq for some probability measure Q P.
(b) A mapping ρ : L∞ → R is continuous and additive if and only if ρ(X) = ρ(1)EQ[X] on L∞ for
some finitely additive measure Q P with total mass 1.
Proof. The proof is identical to that of Lemma 1, with the exception that, continuity on L∞ without
law invariance is not sufficient to guarantee Fatou continuity. As a consequence, Q in (8) is not
necessarily a probability measure; instead, Q is only finitely additive. Absolute continuity of Q
with respect to P is obviously necessary; otherwise EQ is not finite.
7Otherwise the business line i would choose not to join the portfolio X. There is certainly a game-theoretic flavour
to it, relating to the concept of the core of co-operative games; see Denault (2001).
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Remark 3. In the statements of Theorem 3 and Lemma 2, there is an implicit requirement for Q
that EQ is finite on X . This is because Λ and ρ in these results are assumed to take real values. Since
finitely additive measures are not an easy object to work with, we did not include the case q =∞
in Theorem 3, although it is clear that the result holds similarly, and the economic interpretation
remains the same.
5 Concluding remarks
The main result in this short paper reveals a profound conflict between two considerations
in capital allocation rules: top-down consistency and shrinking independence. Both properties
are arguably desirable in the design of capital allocation rules. Unfortunately, as shown from our
impossibility theorem, they do not live well together, and this result still holds true when we relax
some of the conditions in the two properties.
The two properties encode different organizational requirements. On the one hand, top-down
consistency requires capital to be calculated by a centralized approach; the performance of each
line of business is solely understood through its contribution to portfolio risk. On the other hand,
shrinking independence relates to a bottom-up view of the capital allocation process, recognizing
some autonomy to business lines – while diversification should still be reflected in allocated capital,
the risk of individual lines should also be understood in its own right. This tension between top-
down and bottom-up approaches to insurance operations is already foreshadowed in a premium
calculation context by Bühlman (1985).
Hence, our impossibility theorem adds evidence to the view that there are no universally good
methods for capital allocation; one always needs to carefully consider context-specific priorities in
given applications when designing allocation rules. This observation may also partially explain
why capital allocation has remained an active field of study in finance and insurance, with rich
theoretical and applied research findings; see e.g., the recent advances in Boonen et al. (2017),
Centrone and Rosazza Gianin (2018), Asimit et al. (2019), and Bauer and Zanjani (2021).
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A Two classes of capital allocation rules
In this appendix, we formally define two classes of capital allocation rules. The first class is
based on Euler’s principle. The Euler allocation rule is a top-down method, in which the aggregate
capital is computed via a positively homogeneous risk measure ρ. For λ ∈ Rd, write rρ,X(λ) =
ρ(λ ·X) and let S =
∑d




(1), i = 1, . . . , d.
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The Euler allocation satisfies top-down consistency (ii), due to Euler’s principle for positively ho-
mogeneous functions. More precisely, the function rρ,X is positively homogeneous, meaning that
rρ,X(tλ) = trρ,X(λ) for t > 0 and λ ∈ Rd. Euler’s principle gives









For a positively homogeneous risk measure, the Aumann-Shapley capital allocation is equival-
ent to the Euler allocation; see e.g., Denault (2001). In case ρ is the standard deviation, the Euler




, i = 1, . . . , d.
In case ρ is ES at level p, we arrive at the ES-based Euler allocation (2).
The second class of allocation rules is based on stress scenarios. The stress allocation rule
of Millossovich et al. (2021) is defined as Λ(X) = EQX [X] in (1) by assuming that the probability
measure QX satisfies the invariance property, meaning that QX is invariant under strictly increasing
marginal transforms on X. Invariance is a natural property in stress testing since the choice of
the counting units or a transform e.g., from asset returns to log-returns, should not affect stress
scenarios, as discussed by Millossovich et al. (2021). Clearly, any stress allocation rule satisfies
shrinking independence (iii); indeed, strong independence (iv) holds.
A few basic examples of stress allocation rules include the mixture-stress allocation in (3), the
Spearman allocation, and the dual Spearman allocation. Assume that each Xi has a continuous
distribution function Fi and write Ui = Fi(Xi). The Spearman allocation is defined via the stress













for some θ > 0,









for some θ ∈ (0, 1),
The name “Spearman” comes from the fact that E[
∏d
i=1 Ui] is a linear transform of the multivariate
Spearman’s rank correlation of X. The Spearman and dual Spearman allocation rules enjoy several
useful properties, including an independence-preserving property, meaning that an independent
vector X under P remains independent under QX.
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